Reunión del Grupo de Estudio sobre el Mapa Político Mundial
(Unión Geográfica Internacional).
The Study Group on the World Political Map
(San Sebastián, 26-30 de agosto de 1986)
Juan Antonio Sáez García (coord.)
Instituto Geografico Vasco
20080 San Sebastian
Reunión del Grupo de Estudio sobre el Mapa Político Mundial, de la Unión Geográfica Internacional, dentro del marco del Congreso sobre los Países Mediterráneos (San Sebastián, 26 -30 de agosto de 1986). La organización local estuvo a cargo de Javier Gómez Piñeiro y Juan Antonio Sáez, ejerciendo la presidencia del grupo R. J. Johnston: Participaron en la misma una treintena de especialista procedentes de Canadá, Estados Unidos, Brasil, Chile, Australia, Israel, Francia, Reino Unido, Holanda, Bélgica, Italia y Polonia.
Palabras clave: Mapa politico Mundial, Estados, Autodeterminación, Indepenencia, Unión Geográfica Internacional.
Members of the Study Group of World political Map decided to hold a series of meetings on major themes in political geography, thereby to demonstrate the scope and depth of the subdiscipline. Óne of those themes selected for early study was nationalism, along with the. related concepts of selfdetermination and regionalism. It was decided to hold the meeting as part of the programme of the 1986 regional conference of the I.G.U. in Spain, and we were fortunate to be invited to convene in San Sebastián. A programme comprising 28 papers was assembled, involving participants covering all five continents. Unfortunately, seven of them were not presented by the authors at the meeting, for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless a full round of presentations and discussions was held, producing substantial benefits for all concemed.
Key Words: nationalism, self-determination, regionalism, political map.
En la decimosexta asamblea general de la Unión Geográfica Internacional, celebrada en París durante el mes de Agosto de 1984, se acordó que se celebrara en España el siguiente Congreso sobre los Países Mediterráneos, encomendándose su organización al profesor Juan Vila Valentí, catedrático de la Universidad de Barcelona, ciudad en la que se llevó a cabo la sesión principal de la reunión.
La comisión organizadora estuvo encabezada por el profesor José Torroja, presidente del comité español de Geografía de la U.G.I. y catedrático emérito de la Universidad de Barcelona. Como vicepresidentes de la comisión organizadora actuaron el profesor Joaquín Bosque Maurel, secretario del comité español de Geografía de la U.G.I. y catedrático de la Universidad Complutense, el profesor Angel Cabo, presidente de la Asociación de Geógrafos españoles y catedrático de la Universidad de Salamanca, y el profesor Emilio Murcia, director del Instituto Geográfico Nacional y catedrático de la Universidad de Oviedo.
El congreso fue dividido en tres partes. En la primera semana se reunieron una buena parte de las Comisiones, Grupos de Trabajo y Grupos de Estudio de la U.G.I., repartidos entre diversas ciudades. La segunda semana acogió a la Sesión Principal del Congreso, celebrada en Barcelona. Las excursiones ocuparon la tercera y última semana.
En San Sebastián tuvo lugar la reunión del Grupo de Trabajo del "Mapa Político Mundial", presidida por Ronald J. Johnston, estando la organización local a cargo de Javier Gómez Piñeiro y Juan Antonio Sáez, acudiendo a la misma los siguientes geógrafos: Mariana Miranda (Brasil), Jacques Levy (Francia), J.A.M. Cobbah (Estados Unidos), F. Batistti (Italia), Speridiao Faissol (Brasil), Michael Romman (Israel), Stanley Brunn (Estados Unidos), David Mercer (Australia), Alasdair Drysdale (Estados Unidos), David Newman (Israel), Andrew F. Bughardt (Canadá), David B. Knigt (Canadá), James Anderson (Reino Unido), Colin Willíams (Reino Unido), Stanley Waterman (Reino Unido), Yehuda Gradus (Israel), Alexander B. Murphy (Bélgica), C. Hedges (Reino Unido), Eleonore Kofman (Reino Unido), Alfredo Sánchez (Chile), J. Portugalí (Israel), H. Van der Wusten (Holanda), Berta K. Becquer (Brasil), Paul George (Canadá) y M. Rosciszewski (Polonia).
El primer acto celebrado con ocasión de la reunión del Grupo de Estudio fue la recepción ofrecida el día 26 al grupo de congresistas por D. Ramón Labayen, alcalde de San Sebastián, celebrándose durante los días 27, 28 y 29 las sesiones de trabajo en los locales de la Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Guipúzcoa.
Referencias de la reunión aparecieron en la prensa local, y se celebraron entrevistas con miembros de la organización local y algunos congresistas en Radio Nacional de España, Radio Popular y Radiocadena Española.
R. J. Johnston
Department of Geography,
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, U.K.
The Study Group on the World Political Map was established by the Intemational Geographical Union at the Congress in Paris in August 1984. This was the culmination of a great deal of activity, coordinated by the late John House, to gain recognition of the work of political geographers within the I.G.U. A conference held in Oxford in 1983 developed the case for that recognition, and produced a research ageda substantiating the claim regarding the importance of work in political geography. (The major components of that agenda were published as a series of essays emanating from the conference, in P.J. Thylor and J.W. House, editors. Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future Directions. Croom Helm, London, 1985.)
Following its establishment in 1984. members of the Study Group decided to hold a series of meetings on major themes in political geography, thereby to demonstrate the scope and depth of the subdiscipline. Óne of those themes selected for early study was nationalism, along with the. related concepts of selfdetermination and regionalism. It was decided to hold the meeting as part of the programme of the 1986 regional conference of the I.G.U. in Spain, and we were fortunate to be invited to convene in San Sebastián. A programme comprising 28 papers was assembled, involving participants covering all five continents. Unfortunately, seven of them were not presented by the authors at the meeting, for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless a full round of presentations and discussions was held, producing substantial benefits for all concemed. Summaries of the papers are provided here, to indicated the nature of the topics covered.
As well as discussing the issues raised by the individual papers, participants at the meeting were able also to focus attention on general issues relating to the three inter-related concepts. Altough we know a great deal about particular self-determination, regionalisation and nationalist movements, it was clear that we lack a coherent, detailed theoretical framework in which to set this empirical material. Thus the participants left San Sebastián deterrnined to develop such a framework. Inparticular, we were determined to develop the central geographical component of a viable framework -the links between nationalist movements and territory. It is these links which make the geographical perspective on nationalism so important, and which also ensure that it is a central topic to the subdiscipline of political geography.
The San Sebastián meeting was extremely successful in bringing together people with common interests in this important theme and stimulating them to develop their ideas on it. Added stimulus was provided by the local context, for we were able to learn about and experience Basque nationalist claims. We are grateful to our colleagues in the Instituto Geográfico Basco for providing the congenial setting for our discussions; we hope that we may have stimulated political geographical work in Spain through our gathering there.
The members of the Study Group keep in touch through a Newsletter published in Sheffield. Ali interested in our work are invited to join our mailing list.
GEOGRAPHY AND NATIONALISM: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK.
Dr. D. Newman & Dr. J. Portugali,
Department of Geography
Tel Aviv University, Israel.
In several respects. nationalism can be regarded as one of the major political ideologies in modern society. Firstly. its core doctrine -the right of national self determination and the attainment of nation state status -is the only political ideology commonly accepted by capitalist and communist ideologjes aljke. Secondly. and as consequence of the above. nationalism provides a legitimation for the spatjal djvjsjon of the world jnto nation states.
Yet nationalism as a theme is almost absent in recent theoretical discussions regarding modem or advanced capitalism. The consequence is that such a body of literature becomes relevant only to westem societies where national self determination has long ceased to be a central issue. while it is irrelevant or inappropiate to arenas such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. wherein nationalism dominates every sphere of life.
The Israel-Palestinian conflict has recently focussed on the West Bank problematic. Israeli nationalism reaches its extreme in the ultimate concept of the 'Greater Land of Israel' while Arab Palestinian nationalism focuses on the right of self determination and independent statehood.
The practical results of Israeli control of the West Bank since 1967 have led to significant structural change in the relations between the two territories and the two populations. On the one hand. Israel has undertaken a substantial colonisation programme. while on the other hand the economies of Israel and the West Bank have become integrated in a typical colonial relationship. The resulting system of dual space has meant that meaningful contact and interaction between the two populations. despite their spatial proximity. is limited to the minimum. Such structural relations is conducive to further conflict rather than peaceful relations.
TERRITORAL VERSUS DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL AS COMPETING GOALS
THE CASE OF THE JEWISH-ARAB NATIONAL STRUGGLE
Dr. Michael Romann
Department of Geography
Tel-Aviv University, Israel.
Where rival national groups struggle for political dominance over the same territory majority-rninority relations and their spatial distribution are generally determinant factors. In the case of Jewish-Arab conflicting claims for Palestine both, demographic and territorial control were crucial and related issues.
It was particularly the Jewish national movement, being the active force in this long struggle, that constantly faced a basic dilemma. On the one hand it strived to achieve an overall demographic majority and at the same time maximum territorial control. Since the very begining, Zionist policy makers had to choose between the two contradictory goals and strategies concerning land acquisition and settlement; Namely; whether to .'stretch out" and disperse in order to secure future extended boundaries or rather to concentrate the efforts in specific regions where a Jewish majority and territorial continuity could be realized. Since independence, similar questiolis have been relevant to Israeli settlement policies in peripheral areas, such as the Galilee, where the Arab minority still constituted a regional majority. Particularly since 1967 the problem of a Jewish demographic majority versus the extent of territorial boundaries has reemerged at the national scale; with respect to the West-Bank region and even with regard to the city of Jerusalem and it's periphery.
Several conceptual and practical questions should be considered regarding demography and territoriality and their political implications. First, to what extent does the dispersal of Jewish settlements withjn densily inhabitated Arab regions in fact secure territorial control and ley the ground to potential claims to sovereignty? Secondly, in what way do alternative patterns ofpopulation distribution affect segregation or integration and ethnic group co-existence? Finally, the broader questions relating to the essential choices to be made between the models of a Bi-national state and partition, or between the respect for self determination of rninorities and various modes of majority control must be considered.
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
THE CONTEXT FOR CHANGE
David B. Knight
Indigenous peoples in many states have in recent decades experienced rebirth of their distinctive senses of self after decades. indeed centuries. of land dispossessions. governmental denials. and a variety of societally destructive forces. Some such peoples find themselves endangered today because of dreadful governmental oppression. Other such peoples have been able to mobilize themselves and obtain a fair degree of recognition from the governments that now dominate their lives. Even where such recognition has been forthcoming. however. legal and political successes have generally been so limited as to suggest that the peoples may not soon exist as truly distinctive peoples. The realization of the threat has resulted in an increasing effort to work in the international arena to achieve recognition of their rights to self-determination. Just what is meant by the latter term is sometimes obscure or. more often. at odds with the structures and values of the dominant society. The paper examines some instances of how certain indigenous peoples are working within their states and also discusses the international processes that are underway. Some ramifications of these latter processes. if carried further. are discussed from the perspective of how they could help set the stage for a fundamental and positive shift internationally which could impact on the international system of states.
RECENT UNITED NATIONS VOfES ON POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
Stanley D. Brunn
University of Kentucky
Gerald L. Ingalls
University of North Carolina, Charlotte.
U.N. General Assembly sessions regularly discuss and vote on questions of territoria1 self -determination. political independence. and human rights. Within the past decade members have voed on a number of resolutions. including those of the Fa1klands/Malvinas. East Timor. Western Sahara. Cyprus and Kampuchea. Votes have a1so been taken on a variety of questions related to the rights of Palestinian peoples. South Africa.s occupation of Namibia. the situation in Afghanistan. and human rights in Guatema1a. Chile, and El Sa1vador. On many of these resolutations there were a sizable number of Yes. Abstain. and No votes. Third World countries tend to support these resolutions. but the patterns are mixed when the issue directly related to ther continent and region. West European states tended to abstain; The Soviet bloc countries supported these self-determination resolutions. The U.S. record was mixed. Additiona1 study in needed to sort out the existence and persistence of U.N. votes on these issues and those relating to human rights.
MINORITY NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY: IDEALIST INTERPRETATIONS
Colin H. Williams
Department of Geography & Recreation Studies,
North Staffordshire Polytechnic,
Stoke-on-1fent, ST4 2DFZ, U.K.
The past two decades have witnessed a voluminous growth in the literature devoted to the study of minority nationa1ism in Western Europe. The centra1 focus of geographic contributions to this literature has ben upon minority group-state relations interpreted primarily through variants of a core-periphery model of state integration.
This present paper switches attention away from the state context and macro-social. theorising. toward a consideration of key concepts and internal social values developed within certain Celtic societies. It is contended that nationalist mobilisation has been heavily influenced by a particular set of concerns which are far wider and historically pre-date the thrust toward independent nationhood in the post-war period.
The paper has three aims:
1) to examine the idealist alternative of nationalism developed within Wales which has its origin in Christian doctrine and nineteenth century radicalism;
2) to relate significant conceptions of nation-environment associations. such as .cydymdreiddiad. to the wider nationalist historiography wilh its particular emphasis on territorial and communal defence;
3) to interpret the writings of prominent theorist within Welsh society eg. Saunder Lewis. J.R. Jones. G. Evans and to relate these to the wider Celtic and European currents of nationalist thought.
In direct contrast to earlier work of mine this paper will deal only with nationalist thoughts and principles. It is contended that the 'output. side of Welsh nationalism in terms of its party political perfomance. its relative success in "issue politics.. such as language promotion and bilingual education. is already we1l understood. However. key elements of comparison and of contrast between Welsh and other European historiographies remain to be elucidated. especially in view of the fact that certain aspects of Welsh nationalist thought have not been fully discussed on a comparative basis. because key documents and textual criticisms have not been translated from Welsh into a major European language. Thus in a very selfconscious manner this paper wi1l depart from my traditional concern with empirical measurement and with materialist conceptions of social change, to examine the idealist alternative -so beloved of an elder generation of Celtic nationalists.
MINORITE ETHNIQUE, DISCRIMINATION ET TERRlTORIALITE:
LE CAS DES ROMANCHES EN SUISSE
Département de Geographie Université du Québec a Montréal
Bien que peuple bimillénaire depuis 1985, les Romanches des Grisons en Suisse constituent l'une des minorités ethniques les plus méconnues d'Europe Occidentale. Le peuple romanche fait partie d'une fami!le linguistique plus vaste, la minorité rhétoromane des Alpes Centrales et Orientales englobant les Ladins des Dolomites et les Frioulans du Frioul-Vénétie Julienne. Les 36.000 Romanches des Grisons (sur un total de 50.000 en Suisse) doivent défendre seules une langue parlée nulle part aiileurs. Ce petit peuple latin est confronté a une difficile situation aux aspects polymorphes: langue fragmentée en cinq variantes régionales, faiblesse de la presse écrite et audio-visuelle, démographie négative. Le biiinguisme généralisé et institutionnalisé apparait de plus en plus comme une menace de mort pour le romanche tandis que l'école joue comme un instrument de germanisation.
A l'encontre de toute la tradition politique des 25 autres cantons helvétiques, les Romanches subissent sans défense les conséquences inmédiates d'une situation exceptionelle et unique: l'absence de tout princi. pe de territoria/ité /inguistique dans le canton des Grisons. De plus, ils sont victimes d'une discrimination insconsciente puisque le romanche n'est pas langue officielle en Suisse.
La question romancht! ne peut absolument pas se comparer a la question jurassienne car ii n'y a jamais eu de séparatisme ethnique aux Grisons vu l'absence d'une identité "pan-romanche". La non-résolution de la question romanche iilustre parfaitement le fait que le fédéralisme suisse n'est pas un fédéralisme ethnique. La survie de cette vieiile latinité semi-oubliée des Alpes ne doit absolument pas constituer une cause perdue.
THE PARTITIONING OF BELGIUM AWNG LINGUISTIC LINES
Alexander B. Murphy
Department of Geography,
University of Chicago, U.S.A.
This paper looks at the evolution of linguistically defined regions in Belgium since 1830. the partitioning of the country is seem as the culmination of a process whereby areas of a different linguistic character carne to acquire conceptual, functional, and formal significance. Emphasis is placed on the territorial strategies wl!ich promoted this development and the institutionalization of those strategies through legal enactment. The paper seek to demonstrate the significance of territorial arrangements in reflecting and shaping intergroup relations, and in defining the nature and extent of current ethnolinguistic tensions in Belgium.
NEONATIONALISM IN RETREAT: FRANCE IN THE 1980s
The resurgence of regionalist and nationalist movements in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s produced an abundant literature. However, the general decline of such movements (with the exception of Spain) by the 1980s has elicited much less comment.
In this paper I shall focus on the weakening of what have been termed neonationalist movements in France i.e. autonomist movements whose position does not entail the reconstitution of a new nation-state but refers to a poteni:ial for nationhood and the need to regain a certain degree of self-determination. Where possible, I shall try to extend the analysis to othernation-states bearing in mind that any comparative analysis needs to take into account different relationships between the State and civil society and the centre and local.
The importance of neonationalist movements should not, of course, be simply gauged in narrow political terms as evidenced by their ability to win elections locally, regionally and nationally. We should aiso consider their significance as social movements for their rationale was not primarily to win elections but to chal1enge the power of the State and existing social relations. At their peak in the 1960s and 1970s, these movements were able to mobilise certain sections of the regional population around key economic and environmental issues.
The decline of these movements has been variable in space and time. Since the 1960s there have been four regions in France in which regionalist, later to become autonomist/nationalist movements, have made strong demands for political and administrative reforms. These are the French Basque country, Brittany, Corsica and Occitania. Only in Corsica have neonationalist movements managed to remain prominent in regional political activity and represent social forces beyond narrowly based intellectual groups. Corsican movements have been active in a relatively homogeneous regional society, where the transformation from a communitarian to a capitalist society occurred very rapidly, mediated by rigid political structures. Altough the French Basque country has experienced a certain revival of neonationalism in the past few years after a previous peak in the late 1960s, this must be attibuted as much to developments in the Spanish Basque country as to internal social and political changes. Finally in Brittany, and especially Occitania, neonationalist movements have been seriouly divided between traditionalist and modernists, and those emphasising language as the basis of social identity rather than the regional culture as a whole. These movements have been unable to work through their contradictions and to build upon the support they received from the agricultural, industrial and environmental conf1icts that erupted in the 1960s and 1970s. They have failed, for the most part, to recognise the diversity of regional societies and thereby to escape from the logic of the one and indivisible, promulgated by the very State they are criticising.
Nonetheless, many of these movements ideas about the territorialisation of economic and social life (division into "pays") and political slogans, such as "volem vuire al pais" (popularised by Occitan movements in the early 1970s) and .droit a la différence', have been appropiated by the State. Decentralisation, implemented in several stages from 1982, encouragement of local development initiatives and the recent regional elections have all been applied throughout France and not restricted to specific regions. The only special statute granted was to Corsica in 1982, and even this was considerably diluted from the earlier promises made by the Socialists in the 1970s. In no way could the powers conferred to the regions be said to constitute a 'regional state', so much desired by neonationalist movements.
It has been argued that the grand design of a regional society in opposition to the State is utopian and has lost its appeal in a period of economic crisis. Local developmentis now vaunted as the appropriate form of aitemative development. It brings together local econornic, social and po1itical forces, yet does not attempt to practise spatial closure or deny the legitimacy of the State. A recent survey of attitudes towards regionalisation in France found that in several regions, one of which was Languedoc-Roussillon, a strong sense of collective identity was coupled with a deep concem about being deprived of State aid.
Decentralisation has naturally proved a disappointment to neonationalist movements due to its slowness and territorial intransigenge. The Basques were promised a separate department and Bretons the incorporation of Loire-Atlantique to form an enlarged Brittany in the 1981 Socialist Manifesto. Neither promise was kept.
In Corsica, the 'statut particulier' was passed fairly rapidly but without adequate resources or any fundamental transformation of social and political forces. Autonomists (Unione di i Populi Corsu and the sma1ler Partitu Populare Corsu) won 8 seats out of 61 in the first regional elections in 1982 and were able to exert some pressure on the Assembly. However, the final demise of the First Assembly marked the victory of the traditional clans and the closure of the political system. The return of power to the rightwing parties, in control of the Assembly after mid-1984, brought an end to any systematic micro-regional or local development programm~ and subsidies to associatons. The political regrouping around the clans also represented the marginalisation of the liberal petite bourgeosie who had supported the management of modernisation in Corsica.
The withdrawal of the State from direct intervention in the region has brought adversaries into direct confrontation. In the past it was possible for nationalist hostility to be vented against the Other, the enemy outside, namely the State. Now French nationalism is itself organised (Corse Fran~aise et Républicaine) and pitted against Corsican nationalism represented in its radical form until1983 by the Consula di Cumitati Nazionalista and the Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (both now declared illegal). The CCN has been succeeded by the Mouvement Corse pOIJr l'Autodétermination. It is these two nationalisms, with opposing generational and class bases, that have clashed violenty in the past few years.
What have become clearer are therelations of power and class, previously ascribed to the State. Yet in a period of deepening economic crisis and insecurity, the clans have used the protection of the clientelistic system to their advantage and reactivated sentiments of fear and conservatism. Once again, neonationalist movements have been marginalised in the political arena, but have not been capable of occupying the terrain of local issues. The Socialist Government (before March 1985), for its part, tended increasingly to concentrate on symbolic concessions involving language and culture. Its discourse centred on cultural identity and preservation of a Corsican heritage. .
At their peak neonationalist movements in France presented aiternative forms of identity and social practices as well as models of development. As social movements, however, they were unable to sustain more than a narrow base and to resolve the tension between tradition and modernity. Some of their most easily applicable amd modified by the State and local elites. Even where their social base was broader, as in Corsica, they have been unable to offer a challenge to the dominant economic and political forces in the region, but have rallied in new political alliances those groups oppposed to Corsican nationalism.
TOWARDS A GEOGRAPHY OF PEACE IN AFRICA:
A Reexamination of the State and Self-Determination
in Post Colonial Africa
Josiah A.M. Cobbah
Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights
University of Cincinnati College of Law Cincinnati.
The legal concept of self-determination that emerged during the United Nations decolonization period was one which called for the establisment of unitary States that respected established colonial boundaries. As a result many African countries now straddle across different ethnic territories and are faced with the task that maintaining the territorial integrity of the State in the face of serious inter-ethnic conf1icts. Scholars and politicians have so far largely perceived ethnicity in Africa as a source of disunity and instability. This paper argues that ethnic dissatisfaction in Africa shows signs of becolning a positive developmental force if appropiate mechanisms will be put in place to ensure the territoral integrity of ethnic groups.
A close examination of ethnic agitation in Africa will indicate that a commitment to consociational politics and a confrontation of the territoral nature of ethnic politics is needed to bring peace to the continent. Specifically. African countries need to change course from a commitment to integration at all cost to a policy of territorial disintegration where necessary. Where ethnic groups perceive a ranked situation in terms of domination. the politico-territorial arrangement should be broad with regiona1 jurisdiction covering both social and economic concerns. In the case of an unranked situation. less extensive disintegration may suffice.
The international regime of nations is rather rigid and cannot be counted upon for any real changes in the concept of self-determination under international law. In effect. African countries faced with substate ethnic strife will increasingly have to confront the territorial nature of the strife and allow constitutional concessions of territorial self-government in addition to guarantees of equality and non-discrimination.
GEOGRAPHICAL SPACE AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE CHILEAN TERRITORY
University of Concepción
The close relationship that exists between the natural security and the human group which inhabitant it forms the image of a country. In the case of Chile, its natural barriers. and arid desert in the North. the largest ocean to the West, the longest mountain range to the East and Cape Hom to the South; have favoured the creation of well defined territorial frontiers and have played a vital role in the creation of a national sentiment in its inhabitants.
In the intemational context, its geographicallocation in the extreme southwest of the Southamerican continent has given it a certain "tricontinental" connotation with foreign links through the Pacific Ocean to Oceania. South America and the Antartica.
Its geographical -human unity has been the result of historiaI evolution. which has incorporated gradually the different regions. in such a way that its territorail structure has come about principally through legal positions supported by intemationl treaties. without the participation of important migratory movement as has occurred in other countries located in extreme southem zone of the South America continent.
MARXISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
THE CASE OF BURGENLAND, 1919
Harnilton, Ontario L8S 4K1
The connection between Marxism, both in its doctrinal and organizational forms, and self-determinism, has been much noted in our century, particularly since the end of World War II. Dov Ronan has attempted to clarify the varying aspects of self-determination by classifying five archetypes, of which Marxist class struggle, minorities' self-determination, and anti-colonialism are set up as distinc types. Whether or not such clear-cut distintions can be made in the analysis of actual events is, of course, subject to debate. Ronan goes onto emphasize the critica importance of the ..us" and ..them" dichotomy, which underlies all types of movements towards self-determination, however they may perceived or formulated.
Although the impact of Marxism on these movements has become notable since 1945, the impact was present aIso in the transference of territory in Central Europe following the First World War, even if not often noted. It should prove helpful to our understanding of the linkage between Marxims and selfdetermination, to analyze their interplay in the creation of Burgenland and its cession to Austria during the troubled years 1918-21. The Burgenland case is especially suitable for such a study because the Great Powers of the time were little interested in two losers, and because both Socialism and Comunism were significant forces in the area at the time.
In 1918 the portion of western Hungary which became Burgenland was, economically and socially in a quasi-feudal situation. Altough most of the peasantry owned land, the area was dominated by the huge land holdings of the nobility. Because of intensifying land-hunger emigration was heavy. Sopron (Ödenburg) was the oncly city; it was essentially a marketing and administrative centre with little manufacturing. The northern portions of this frontier strip were within fifty to one hundred kilometers of Vienna, and weekly commuting to jobs in Vienna had become common by 1900. Austria and the city of Vienna had Socialists governments, and it must be remembered that Socialist parties of the time were far more strongly Marxist and anti-clerical than they appear to be today.
Marxism had a curious impact on the drive for self-determination in northern Burgenland. On a doctrinal level, the Marxist (i.e. Socialist) spokesmen expressed no interest in cultural self-determination. The attempt to unite people or creat groups purely on the basis of language or cultural heritage, was seen as a retrograde step. Some years later, in fact, when some of the Croatian intellectual established a body to further Croatian culture and self-identity, the Socialists Croats opposed it vehemently. In their eyes the bonding element was not language, or culture per se, but rather economic class. These men worked in Vienna, principally in construction jobs, were ardent members of the Socialist Party, carried the red flag, and felt themselves to be bound into a brotherhood of the proletariat. They were clearly in favour of the transfer of Burgenland to Austria, but not for the reasons espoused by Woodrow Wilson, and the many nationalistic spokesmen then rife in Central Europe. Their jobs were in Austria; their fellowship was with Austrian workers. To return to Ronan, these workers stressed the "us" half of the dichotomy; the ..them" half was never clearly formulated, at least not in terms of the Hungarian.
Elsewhere in Burgenland, away from the commuter belt, the peasanatry tended to oppose Marxism vehemently, at least as they perceived or experienced it. They remained within the established world view of land, family, and village, closely tied to the local church. The clergy was strongly anti-Marxist, and most of the peasantry accepted that position. Equally important were the events of March to August 1919 when Hungary was under the Communist government of Bela Kun. Showing a preference for the proletariat, the government commandeered food to feed the urban population. A peasants' rebellion broke out in June, along the borders of Burgenland, and was quickly crushed. Any appeal the Marxist parties may have had for the land-hungry peasantry, was lost. In Ronan's terms, the peasants had only a weak sense of ..us", but a very strong sense of ..them".
Subsequently, when the arch-conservative Admiral Horthy replaced Bela Kun, there was a marked swing in favour of Hungary, but by then the Allies in Paris had aIready awarded Burgenland to Austria. The Allies, were not likelly to favour Communist Hungarian claims to territory. Throughout this time there was also a party espousing linguistic nationalism but its leadership was strongly non-Marxist and became, in time, pro-Nazi.
Sopron, the city, did not have its fate decided until the plebiscite of December 1921, when it voted to remain with Hungary. One of the arguments which had a strong impact on the vote stressed that whereas Hungary had ousted its Marxist govemment, Austria was sti11 being ruled by the Socialists.
The request to the victorious Allies for the annexation of Burgenland was made by the Austrian govemment of the time, led by the Socialist Karl Renner. In reading his submission to the peace commission in Paris, it becomes clear that its arguments rested principally on the need to feed the hungry workers of Vienna; and the advisability of moving the boundary awaw from the city, thus incorporating too the area of the comrnuter workers.
In summary, it becomes clear that Marxist doctrine and the Marxist parties seemed to work at crosspurposes with the movement for self-determination. Marxists saw their comrnunity in class, not ethnic terms. Yet, altough their emphasis on the need to feed the urban workers let the the antipathy of many of the peasants, it led too to the cession of Burgenland to Austria. Marxism was clearly a polarizing force in 1919. For those who espoused it, it created a strong sense of ..us"; for those who opposed it, it created and equally strong sense of "them".
NATIONAL INTEGRATION PROBLEMS IN THE ARAR WORLD: THE CASE OF SYRIA
Department of Oeography,
College of Liberal Arts, University of New Hampshire
The integration problems of Arab countries have, with the exception of ubanon, Sudan, and lraq, received little attention. This paper focuses on Syria, whose state-building experience illustrates many of the problems encountered within the Arab world generally. In particular, it examines the interaction between supranational, national, and subnational allegiances and identities and the way in which definitions of national identity have changed in the region.
Arab nationalism is a unification nationalism, similar in respects to the German and ltalian movements of the 19th century. To Arab nationalists, the division of the Arabs into a large number of states by the colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries was wholly artifical. The natural unity of the Arab nation would eventually be restored and the individual states wither away. The states, because of their origins, lacked legitimacy and by definition could never be the focus for national allegiances because their inhabitants were not distinct nations but components of one sing'e Arab nation. Arabs still think of themselves as one nation which is subdivided into many states, but the dream of uniting these into one state is now recognized as unattainable. The states have gradually become the focus of quasinational allegiances.
In Syria, attachment to the pan-Arab suprastate idea has traditionally been particularly strong, to the extent that many of its leaders long felt obliged to reject the state's very existence and consciously avoided cultivating a specifically Syrian. centripetal inconography. According to the logic of Arab unity, statebased allegiances could be described as regionalist and separatist. During the 1950s, the Syrian state-idea was so weak, and the idea of Arab unity so strong, that Syria's survival seemed in doubt. In 1958, it ceased to exist, merging completely with Egypt. Ironically the union, which was a failure and ended with Syria's bitter secession in 1961, did much to fix Syria in Syriand minds. Since then, Syria has not surrendered its sovereignty in the interests of Arab unity and has acquired a quasinational identity.
If one characteristic of many Arab states until recently was the primacy of supranational allegiances over national (i.e. state-based) ones, another, paradoxically, was the strenght of subnational (i.e. substate) ones. Almost all Arab states are stratrified linguistically and religiously to some degree. In Syria, the division are mainly sectarian, with a Sunni Muslim majority and Christian, Alawi, and Druze minorities. The latter two splinter Shi'i groups inhabit peripheral mountain zones and successfully resisted integration well into this century. Contrary to the pattern one would expect to find, in Syria the Sunni majority is in a subordinate position, with power in the hands of a traditionally disadvantagedy minority. Since 1963 the Alawis have played a pivotal role in the country's political life, largely because of their overrepresentation in the armed forces and the nominally secularist, socialist Ba'th party. Opposition to the perceived Alawi monopolization of power culminated in widespread sectarian disturbances, including popular uprisings in 1980 and 1982. Nevertheless, too much weight can be given to the sectarian factor in Syrian political life. The distinction between sectarian and class indentities is not always readily apparent because they are so intertwined.
Whereas the Sunnis initially regarded Syria as il1egitimate, the minorities traditionally considered the state's continued existence preferable to its incorporation within a large Arab state and were less receptive to the idea of Arab unity, which would further dilute their intluence. Thus, unlike in most countries, the minorities historical1y had a greater stake than the majority in the state's independence and perpetuation. It has even argued that the emergence of quasinational Syrian identity can be partly attributed to minority control, although many other more important factors are involved.
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF NATIONAL TERRITORY ?
The Open University, U.K.
Is it possible to construct a general theory ofa phenomenon as complex and varied as nationalism? It combines politic, economics, culture and psychology; it has been used by very different groups and classes for different and often conflicting purposes; and it has been linked with other ideologies right across the political spectrum. The most persuasive theories are either marxist or weberian, butthey generally overemphasize, respectively, either nationnalism's economic or cultural aspects, and typically they cover only some historical forms of nationalism and not others. Some authorities, including recently two geogra phers, conclude that general theory is not possible. Colin Williams (185, 350) writes:
In similar vein, John Agnew (1986,6) notes that general theories of nationalism generally assume erroneously that it is an autonomous, trascendental or unchanging force, and he suggests that because nationalism is .contextually constituted' general theory is impossible.
Nationalisms are indeed to an important extent constituted by their unique loctions in space and time, and this helps account for their diversity. Wether expressed in popular sentiments, organized movements or state policies, they are a territorial form of ideology. Nations, like states, are not simply located in geographic space -which is the case with ail social organizationsrather they explicitly claim particular territories and derive distinctiveness from them. Indeed nationalists typically over-emphasize the particularity and uniqueness of their own territory and history.
However, while fully acknowledging the diversity of nationalisms, we should not overplay their differences and uniqueness. The conclusion that general theory is impossible has to be questioned and the issues involved kept open for debate.
Firstly, beyond nationalism, there is the wider issue of whether an emphasis on the formative influence of space-time location undermines general social theory, with the danger that a one-side stress on geographical particularity could spill over into a retreat to empiricism. Secondly, as far as nationalism is concerned, there are sound bases for generalising which avoid (as Marx and Weber avoiped) erroneous assumptions about it being transcendental or unchanging. Nationalism are constituted by more than their immediate context in time and space. They dwell on their own past and are influenced by other nationalisms past and present. Moreover. nationalism is an historically specific phenomenon -albeit one with a long time-span -which coincides and connects with the rise of capitalism from feudal and other non-capitalist societies. and the development of an integrated world system dominated by imperialism. itself an outgrowth of nationalism. Particular nationalisms share the same interdependent world and many of the same problems as other nationalisms -all of which provides bases for generalising across space and time. Thirdly. there is a need for such generalisation -not as an alternative to detailed study in particular regions and periods but as complementary to it. We cannot study nationalisms only on a case by case basis. Despite their diversity they exhibit significant common characteristics -not least great flexibility and popularity in different situations -and there are common patterns and trends over space and time which require general explanation.
We therefore have to work towards a general theory. but .towards. with a .?'. For instance, in the search for .unity of explanation., it may be that a unifying theoretial framework linking a number of related theories is a more realistic and useful objective than a single theory -certainly it would be more useful than some existing theories which pretend to cover nationalism in general but which ignore some of its major aspects and phases or define them out of existence. It is still unclear -and open for debate -how far it if fruitful to go in search of general theory. particularly with respect to covering the different historical forms of nationalism.
However. we can make some progress by analysing the formal characteristics of nationalist ideology and its relationships with territory. for these are essential elements in any theoretical framework. .Nationalist ideology and territory. draws on marxist and weberian theories in analysing nationalisms.s political relations to statehood and democracy, to culture and feelings of belonging to a .community.. to economic development and the interests of dominant and subordinate classes. These elements are all related to territory in the belief that territoriality is the key to understanding nationalism.
Agnew, J.(1986) 'Nationalism: Autonomous force or practical politics', paper presented to the Institute of British Geographers Annual Meeting, University of Reading, 26 pp.
Williams, C.H. (1985) Conceived in bondage : called unto liberty: reflections on nationalism. Progress in Human Geography, 4. 3. pp. 331-55.
TOWARD THE GENESIS OF NEW TERRITORIAL UNITS:
is it the case of Alpe-Adria?
University of Triestre (Italy)
School of Modern Languages
The aim of this papel is to draw the attention upon a possible model of territorial integration arising in the central European area, under the heading of Alpe-Adria. It is a type of political cooperation between local states (regions and federate states) pertaining to West Gerrnany, Austria, ltaly and Yugoslavia, in an area of about 232.613 sq. kms, with a total population of more than 26 million inhabitants.
This territory is being given a common perspective following the shift to the creation of a cooperative councils to gather the peripheral regions along the Alps, which begun in 1972 (Community of Western Alps) and was established in Venice in 1978.
This kind of territorial integration shares some features of each the classic processes oif regionalization, the centripetal model, appealling to the myth of ethnic omogeneity, and the confused melting pot dominated by a net ofeconomic relations marching at a world scale. This model is in fact characterised by: contiguity integration, ethnic eterogeneity, spatial dirnensions at an interrnediate level (between the 7th-8th levels in the classification of market areas developed for Western Europe by W. Christaller (1952) ).
AII this is of particular interest for the geographer. taking place in a situation where the economic importance of the nation:al state is declining. and paradoxically. the economies of scale of the socialized sectors could assure some perspectives to smaller spatial unites. aggregated on an ethnical basis.
ECONOMIE GWBALE COMME ELEMENT D'ETUDES DE LA GEOGRAPHIE POLITIQUE
Institut de Géographie
Académie Polonaise des Sciences
L'évolution contemporaine de l'espace socio-économique mondiale ouvre un nouveau champ de recherche en géographie politique. Il s'agit des conséquences spatiales du développement de l'économie globale ainsi que de la globalisation de beaucoup des processus économiques, sociaux et culturels. Les processus de globalisation décident de la formation et de la dynamique de nouvelles divisions régionales, des changements dans la répartition des espaces centraux et péripheriques mondiaux, des changements dans les formes et le caractere du développement dépendent et interdépendent etc. On a également affaire a un probleme important de la réduction ou de la limitation du role de la souverainité de l'Etat dans la formation de son propre espace. L'économie g!obale et son développement occasionnent aussi des conséquences politiques importantes dans le domaine de fonctionnement des firmes multinationales ainsi que l'acces a cette économie des firmes et des activités nationales. L'économie globale crée un type nouveau des espaces fonctionnels qui sont soumis a des régularités plus générales que celles qui sont déterminées par la politique du pays particulier. De l'autre coté les processus de marginalisation des parties de l'espace du pays donné sont aujourd'hui dans beaucoup de cas la conséquence du manque /ou de la perte/ du contact avec des régularités du développement de l'économie globale. La géographie politique peut trouver un champ intéressant de la recherche en analysant les processus globaux du développement économique. Cela demande une interconnexion avec la géographie économique ou sociale. On voit ici entre autres deux modes d'approche différents: une nouvelle carte /cartes/ politique du monde ainsi q'une nouvelle carte /cartes/ politique des pays particulier; ces cartes se créent sous l'influence du développement de l'économie globale. La géographie politique ne peut pas aujourd'hui éviter d'analyser les conséquences du développement de l'économie globale car son impact sur touts les éléments de l'évolution de l'espace porte un caractere fondamental.